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Irreconcilable Differences? The Road Traffic Act and the European Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Directives.  
 
James Marson,* Katy Ferris** and Alex Nicholson*  
 
Abstract             
 
The UK has a chequered past in relation to its compliance with EU law. In 
some instances, it has gone beyond the minimum requirements imposed by 
its EU parent in providing protection for individuals (see for instance the UK’s 
implementation of Art. 9 of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive 
2009/103/EC). Regrettably, however, there is a greater number of examples 
where the UK has failed in its transposition obligations. One area where a 
significant disconnect exists between national and EU law is third party motor 
vehicle insurance. This is perhaps justifiable in some instances given the 
evolution of the domestic and EU laws, their original incarnation compared 
with modern requirements, and the effects of judicial interpretation and the 
creativity of the Court of Justice of the European Union. However, other 
inconsistencies are less easy to accept. There are an increasing number of 
errors in interpretation, historic and contemporary, which necessitate a 
comprehensive review of the national law, a policy review of the state’s 
abrogation of its responsibilities to the victims of uninsured and untraced 
drivers, and corrective action to prevent liability being imposed on the UK.   
 
Introduction  
 
In the UK, the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88) is the mechanism which, in 
most cases, ensures the innocent victims of negligent driving gain protection. 
This is achieved through the obligation imposed on the owners of vehicles to 
have, as a minimum, third party motor insurance for vehicles used on a road 
or other public place.1 In respect of liability incurred by uninsured or untraced 
drivers, the UK has alternative, extra-statutory arrangements in place with a 
private organisation called the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB) to ensure 
compensation is available. However, in recent years it has become apparent 
that the combined protection afforded by the existing statutory and extra-
statutory framework in the UK falls short of that which is required under EU 
law. These EU laws have evolved through a series of directives (known 
collectively as the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID))2  to impose 
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1
 RTA88 s.143. 
2
 (The First Directive) Council Directive 72/166/EEC on the approximation of the laws of 
Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [1972] OJ 
L103/1; (The) Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles [1984] OJ LL8/17; (The) Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC on the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use 
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obligations on member states to ensure that funds are always available to 
compensate the innocent victims of a motor vehicle accident, regardless of 
the financial position of the negligent driver. In many cases, the RTA88 and 
the agreements in place with the MIB (“the MIB agreements”) provide 
requisite protection. However, the High Court,3 as confirmed in the Court of 
Appeal,4 recently declared a particular exclusion which, until 1 August 2015, 
was contained within the MIB agreements, to be incompatible with EU law 
and awarded damages in state liability in respect of that transposition failure. 
Furthermore, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has 
confirmed, in a preliminary reference from Slovenia, that the requirement for 
member states to ensure that third party victims of motor vehicle accidents 
are adequately compensated, extends to vehicles operated on private land.5 
This reference has highlighted a further deficiency in the UK's transposition as 
the national law and extra-statutory arrangements do not presently cover the 
full extent of “vehicles” and the geographic scope of their use.  
 
It is unfortunately not just these two developments which necessitate a 
fundamental review6 of the RTA88 and the MIB agreements as substantial 
sections of both are contrary to the MVID.7 In the absence of reform, further 
state liability claims against the UK, and/or infringement proceedings by the 
EU Commission seem the natural consequence. Practitioners8 who use the 
MVID as the starting point for their advice, and who use the existing tools to 
invoke EU law in the courts, including compelling a teleological interpretation 
of the domestic law, will find domestic law can be changed more promptly 
than waiting for action from the Secretary of State and MIB. 
 
Contractual and statutory insurer 
 
The natural “hierarchy” of responsibility to the third party victims of accidents 
involving a motor vehicle is first, the claimant would seek redress from the 
contractual insurer. Where this is not applicable under the contractual 
relationship between the insurer and the insured person, s.148 RTA88 has 
                                                                                                                                                              
of motor vehicles [1990] OJ L129/33; Directive 2000/26/EC on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (The Fourth Motor 
Insurance Directive) [2000] OJ L181/65; (The Fifth Directive) Directive 2005/14/EC amending 
Council Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC, 88/357/EEC and 90/232/EEC and Directive 
2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to insurance against civil 
liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [2005] OJ L149/14; and (The Sixth Directive) 
Directive 2009/103/EC relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [2009] OJ 
L263/11. 
3
 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB). 
4
 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] EWCA Civ 172. 
5
 Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav [2014] Judgment 4 September. 
6
 For an excellent discussion of the necessity for reform of the statutory and extra-statutory 
arrangements see Bevan, N. “On the Right Road” (Parts I-IV) (2013) 163 New Law Journal 
7546, p.94; 7547, p.130; 7548, p.160; 7549, p.193. 
7
 For an authoritative review of the domestic and EU law on motor insurance law see Merkin, 
R.M., and Hemsworth, M. “The Law of Motor Insurance” (2015) Sweet and Maxwell. 
8
 See the work of Nicholas Bevan who, through his blog Nota Bene 
(http://www.nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/call-for-reform-of-our-national.html) and 
contributions in the New Law Journal, has campaigned vigorously for the reform of the law. 
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the ability to modify the contract of insurance or s.151 RTA88 statutorily binds 
the insurer to continue with its insurance obligations. This sees the application 
of what is known as an “Article 75 insurer” procedure and finally, the MIB acts 
as the “insurer of last resort” in cases where insurance claims would not be 
satisfied where, for instance, a driver has no insurance or where the insurer 
avoided the contract of insurance.  
 
Interpretative difficulties 
 
Although the RTA 1930 was enacted to provide a system of compensation, 
through compulsory insurance, to innocent victims of accidents involving the 
use of motor vehicles, it was underpinned by common law rules. These 
allowed insurers to evade their responsibilities in this regard through the 
operation of privity of contract, even though the nature of the contractual 
agreement was for the benefit of the third party. The insurers would restrict 
their contractual liability to their policyholders (and seeking to exclude any 
other claimant on this policy – such as the third party victim) and further used 
this to prevent the settlement of claims direct with such victims (due to their 
status as non-contracting parties). Beyond the development and extension of 
the many exceptions to the privity rule, it continues to be a principle of the 
English legal system. The remnants of the restrictions that exist between the 
statutory provisions and the civil law can be seen in ss.148 and 151 RTA88, 
each included only to circumvent the flaws contained in the original RTA 1930 
relating to contractual / tortious liability. It is their inclusion that also has 
caused many of the underlying problems in the UK’s adherence to the MVID. 
Third party victims had the contractual benefit of the insurance policy 
protection transferred to them, but this operated on a subrogated basis and 
therefore any contractual defences available by the insurer to the policyholder 
could also be exercised against the third party.9  
 
Section 148(2) identifies eight reasons, referred to as ‘matters’, which, if used 
by an insurer to avoid a policyholder’s claim under that policy (for example 
because the insurer argues a breach of contract on the part of the 
policyholder) would be held as void. The result is that the insurer would 
continue to have to satisfy a third party’s claim for damage or loss suffered as 
a consequence of the accident. The eight reasons include the age or physical 
or mental condition of persons driving the vehicle (such as the driver 
operating a car whilst drunk); the condition of the vehicle (such as a car 
having illegally worn tyres); the number of persons that the vehicle carries; the 
weight or physical characteristics of the goods that the vehicle carries; the 
time at which or the areas within which the vehicle is used; the horsepower or 
cylinder capacity or value of the vehicle; the carrying on the vehicle of any 
particular apparatus; or 
the carrying on the vehicle of any particular means of identification other than 
that required by law.  
 
Where problems occur is in the interpretation of the legislators’ intentions. 
Was the list to be illustrative or exhaustive? It is evident, with hindsight at 
                                                        
9
 See Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 577. 
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least, that the intention of Parliament was to ensure independent statutory 
rights to compensation (beyond the contractual and common law principles 
which had restricted those rights) but that they had inadvertently established a 
qualified entitlement to access based on matters beyond the third party’s 
control or access (the contractual agreement between the insurer and the 
assured). The MVID incorporate certain derogations10 for member states from 
the obligation of ensuring compulsory insurance of vehicles, whilst also 
expressing a (non-exhaustive)11 list of possible exclusions which would be 
held as void against third parties. 12  Demonstrating an unfortunate 
misunderstanding of the relationship between the MVID and the RTA88, in 
EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership, 13  when considering the extent of Ruiz 
Bernaldez14 (where the CJEU confirmed that the only permissible grounds for 
excluding a third party’s right to claim against the policyholder’s insurers was 
where the third party knew that the vehicle was stolen)15 the Court of Appeal 
held that the principles established in Bernaldez were not of general 
application. In a unanimous judgment delivered by Ward LJ, the Court of 
Appeal retreated to the safety of concluding that the use of a finite list in 
s.148(2) was, by implication, instructive that all contractual exclusion clauses 
outside of this list were permissible. Given that in Correia Ferreira v 
Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confiança SA, 16  Candolin v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio Pohjola, 17  Farrell v Whitty, 18  and Churchill v 
Wilkinson and Tracey Evans19 the CJEU had applied the interpretation of 
exclusions of liability consistently within the strict reasoning of Bernaldez, for 
the Court of Appeal to ignore these cases suggests either negligence or a 
misunderstanding of the hierarchy of EU and domestic law, explicitly 
established in s.2 European Communities Act 1972. Indeed in Candolin, the 
CJEU referred to Bernaldez20 when commenting that it had previously “… 
held that Art 3(1)… precludes an insurer from relying on statutory provisions 
or contractual clauses in order to refuse to compensate third-party victims of 
an accident caused by the insured vehicle.”21  
 
The MIB and associated agreements 
 
                                                        
10
 Art.5. 
11
 Case C-129/94 Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. 
12
 Art.13 Directive 2009/103/EC. 
13
 [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. 
14
 Case C-129/94 Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. 
15
 The CJEU achieved this through purposively interpreting the list of void exclusions provided 
in Art.2(1) of the Second MVID (now contained in Art.13(1) of the Sixth MVID) as being 
illustrative and thereby extending the scope of the civil liability insurance requirement 
contained in Art.3(1) of the First MVID. 
16
 Case C-348/98 Vitor Manuel Mendes Ferreira and Maria Clara Delgado Correia Ferreira v 
Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confiança SA [2000] ECR 1-6711. 
17
 Case C-537/03 Katja Candolin, Jari-Antero Viljaniemi and Veli-Matti Paananen v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhti&ouml Pohjola and Jarno Ruokoranta [2005] ECR I-5745. 
18
 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty (C-356/05) [2007] ECR I-3067.  
19
 Case C-442/10 Churchill Insurance Company Limited v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy 
Evans v Equity Claims Limited [2011] ECR I-00000. 
20
 at [20]. 
21
 at [18]. 
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The MIB is a private company,22 incorporated in 1946, which exists to reduce 
the negative consequences for victims of road traffic accidents caused by 
uninsured and/or untraced drivers in the UK, principally by providing 
compensation to the innocent victims where they would otherwise be left 
without an adequate remedy.23 The MIB reports that uninsured and untraced 
drivers “… kill 130 people and injure 26,500 every year.”24 As such, it plays a 
vital role in protecting road users in the UK. It exists to compensate the 
victims of negligent uninsured,25 untraceable motorists26 or accidents caused 
by the negligent driving of foreign motorists,27 and every insurer operating a 
business incorporating the underwriting of compulsory motor insurance is 
required to be a member of the MIB.28  
 
The MIB's liability to an individual victim derives solely from agreements that it 
has entered into over the last 70 years with the Secretary of State for 
Transport and his predecessors. For an accident occurring today, the MIB's 
legal obligations are contained within the Uninsured Drivers' Agreement 
(UDA) 2015 and the Untraced Drivers' Agreement (UtDA) 2003 (as 
amended), both of which contain provision for termination by either party on 
12 months' notice.29 In the absence of these agreements or following their 
termination by either party, the MIB would have no liability for accidents 
occurring (post termination) as there is no legislation in force which makes the 
MIB responsible for uninsured/untraced30 drivers' liability. 
 
The UDA 2015 applies to accidents occurring on or after 1 August 2015, 
whilst those occurring prior to this would be dealt with according to the 
agreement of 1999.31 The MIB’s principal obligation under that agreement is 
to pay (or cause to be paid) any judgment that a claimant has been awarded 
                                                        
22
 Although it could equally be argued that it exists as an emanation of the national motor 
industry. 
23
 “Memorandum and Articles of Association” (1946, as amended by special resolution 
passed on 7 June 2012) Motor Insurers' Bureau; see 
http://www.mib.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/32A4AB2C-5B4A-43A8-8610-
1A629B7A933B/830/ArticlesofAssociation070612.pdf (accessed 27 May 2015), pp.2-4. 
24
 “Two million warnings sent to tackle uninsured driving” (27 November 2014) Motor Insurers' 
Bureau; see http://www.mib.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F7D8D0E9-9FFF-4A12-B516-
6EDEBB808ACB/0/PressreleaseTwomillionwarningssenttotackleuninsureddriving.pdf 
(accessed 27 May 2015), p. 1. 
25
 In the event of accident being caused, or contributed to by, a driver who was uninsured at 
the time (holding no valid policy of insurance), but who, by the nature of the event is 
identified, the MIB will consider dealing with the claim for compensation from the victim. 
26
 This applies to victims of an accident where the driver deemed responsible for the accident 
leaves the scene without identifying him/herself and cannot be traced. The MIB will consider 
claims of compensation in respect of damages to property and personal injury. 
27
 The ‘green card scheme’ applies to accidents caused through the negligent driving of 
foreign motorists. Here the MIB may deal with the victim’s claim for damages to property or 
personal injury rather than require them to seek communication from the foreign insurer. 
28
 See ss.95, 143 and 145(2) of the RTA88. 
29
 The UDA 2015, cl.2(3); see http://www.mib.org.uk/media/166917/2015-uninsured-drivers-
agreement-england-scotland-wales.pdf (accessed 8 October 2015) and The UtDA 2003, 
cl.3(2); see http://www.mib.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/CF78D433-D453-4AB5-9DCA-
10C00538CBBC/0/030207MIBUntracedAgreement7Feb2003sealedversion.pdf (accessed 28 
May 2015). 
30
 The UDA 1999, cl.4(1)(b). 
31
 The UDA 1999, cl.4(1) and the UDA 2015, cl.2(1). 
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which comprises liability that is required to be covered by insurance pursuant 
to Part VI of the RTA88, and which has not been satisfied in full within 7 days, 
whether or not the driver is in fact insured.32  
 
The UDA and UtDA have each been amended, supplemented and/or 
replaced on a number of occasions: in recent history the UDA 1999 was 
amended on 7 November 200833 and then effectively replaced (in respect of 
future incidents) on 3 July 2015,34 and the UtDA 2008 has been amended five 
times, on 30 December 2008,35  15 April 2011,36  30 April 2013, 37  8 June 
2015 38  and 3 July 2015. 39  These amendments predominantly represent 
attempts to bring the framework in to line with the requirements of EU 
legislation. However, as a result of the lack of a statutory basis for the MIB’s 
liability and the reactive, piecemeal manner in which these agreements have 
been amended since their formation,40 establishing liability against the MIB 
has become a somewhat complicated, convoluted and confusing task, and 
there remains considerable scope for incompatibility with European 
legislation.   
 
Accessing the MVID 
 
As this paper identifies some of the more serious breaches of the MVID, and 
as there has been a confusing level of inaction by the EU Commission on the 
matter of enforcing the MVID in the UK, how the MVID may be enforced or 
how they may be invoked in national courts is of immediate concern. Whilst it 
is beyond the scope of this paper to examine which articles of the MVID would 
satisfy the criteria to be directly effective in national courts, the significant first 
step is to identify if the MIB is an emanation of the state to facilitate further 
investigation into the provisions within the MVID. 
                                                        
32
 The UDA 1999, cl.5(1) and the UDA 2015, cl.3. 
33
 Supplementary Uninsured Drivers' Agreement 1999; see 
http://www.mib.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/5ADC3E9F-44B9-4667-9B78-
69A458D00800/0/SupplementaryAgreement071108.pdf. 
34
  Effective for claims on or after the 1 August 2015 
http://www.mib.org.uk/Downloadable+Documents/en/Agreements/Uninsured+Agreements/De
fault.htm 
35
 First Supplementary UtDA; see http://www.mib.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AA4DF623-8461-4263-
9D02-E37BF498A6A1/0/SupplementaryUntracedDriversAgreement2009.pdf (accessed 28 
May 2015). 
36
 Second Supplementary UtDA: see http://www.mib.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/DD1C220B-F488-
414F-B8B5-
39ADC8D8077A/0/2nd_Supplementary_Agreement_for_the_Untraced_DriversAgreement.pdf 
(accessed on 28 May 2015). 
37
 Third Supplementary UtDA; see http://www.mib.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/06ED4EEF-7DDD-
4A9E-98A0-
3434854DBB13/0/Untraced_PD_limitation_supplementary_30_April_2013_signed.pdf 
(accessed on 28 May 2015). 
38
 Fourth Supplementary UtDA; see http://www.mib.org.uk/media/166877/2015-fourth-
supplementary-agreement-for-the-untraced-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-and-
wales.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2015). 
39
 Fifth Supplementary UtDA; see http://www.mib.org.uk/media/166874/2015-fifth-
supplementary-agreement-for-the-untraced-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-and-
wale.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2015). 
40
 Bevan, N. “A Call for (More) Reform” 165 New Law Journal 7661, p.9. 
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The existence of the MIB as a compensatory body for the requirements of EU 
law 
 
In 1972, the first Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive was enacted which 
required member states to, inter alia, “take all appropriate measures to ensure 
that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in [their] 
territory [was] covered by insurance”.41 On 1 January 1973, the UK became a 
member of the then European Economic Community42 and consequently was 
obliged to follow superior EU laws. As the RTA was already in existence, and 
indeed was the inspiration for the First Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive, it 
was chosen as the main domestic mechanism for the transposition of the 
MVID.43 
  
Part VI of the RTA88 implements much of the content of the MVID. In Art.10, 
the MVID requires member states to make “provision for a body to guarantee 
that the victim will not remain without compensation where the vehicle which 
caused the accident is uninsured or unidentified.” The body chosen in the UK 
was the MIB and in this respect, two significant questions are present in 
relation to its function and the remit of its operation. First, does the MIB exist 
as an emanation of the state for the purposes of enforcing EU law? Secondly, 
if the MIB exists as the statutorily required insurer of last resort (for the 
purposes where the claimant is the victim of an uninsured or untraced driver), 
what role does it have when it is being applied in domestic law where some 
insurance exists?  
 
In respect of the requirements regarding the liability of uninsured and 
untraced drivers, following the enactment of each directive the UK has 
consistently opted to retain the arrangements that were already in place with 
the MIB many years earlier, subject to variations of the agreements where this 
was considered appropriate. Responsibility for paying compensation in 
instances of uninsured / untraced drivers rests with the MIB. Responsibility for 
paying compensation to persons suffering loss when the state is in breach of 
EU law rests with the state44 and the direct effect of directives is only (save 
exceptional cases)45 applicable vertically against an emanation of the state. It 
is the very nature of the agreement relationship between the MIB and the 
state that raises questions as to whether it would satisfy the tests as outlined 
in Foster and others v British Gas plc?46 as:  
 
                                                        
41
 Council Directive 72/166/EEC on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating 
to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the 
enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [1972] OJ L103/1, Art.3(1). 
42
 Decision of the Council of the European Communities concerning the accession of the 
Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Coal and Steel Community [1972] OJ L73/12, 
Art.2.  
43
 As subsequently updated through to the Sixth, consolidating, Directive. 
44
 As a matter of national procedural law. 
45
 Such as Case C-194/94 CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL 
[1996] ECR I-2201. 
46
 Case C-188/89 Foster v British Gas [1990] ECR I-3313. 
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“a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, 
pursuant to a measure adopted by the state, for providing a public 
service under the control of the state and has for that purpose special 
powers beyond that which result from the normal rules applicable in 
relations between individuals...”?47  
 
Historically, claims of state liability were made against the central state itself 
but this was not a limiting factor. The CJEU adopted a unitary concept of the 
state (according to an international court model) and hence there was no 
demarcation of activities of the authority as either being responsible for the 
breach of the EU law or in the paying of damages. Bodies undertaking the 
functions of the state (be they administrative or legislative) began to be held 
responsible for breaches.48 Beyond identifying the liability of state bodies in 
damages, the CJEU turned its attention to the concept of the state for the 
purposes of the direct effect of directives. Including Foster, former 
nationalised utility bodies,49 a regional authority,50 a police force,51 a health 
authority,52 a tax authority53 and the board of governors of a state school54 
have been held to satisfy the bipartite / tripartite55 tests for establishing the 
status as an emanation of the state. Bodies which are legally distinct from the 
state, but to which administrative tasks have been delegated or assigned had 
also been similarly designated. 56  Particularly relevant to the MIB and its 
agreement with the state was the case of Mighell and ors v Reading57 where 
claimants who sought to rely directly on the Second Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Directive failed to persuade the Court of Appeal that the MIB was an 
emanation of the state. However, in Evans v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, 58  whilst the Advocate-General 
accepted the claimant’s argument that the MIB was not an emanation of the 
state for the purposes of that directive, the CJEU disagreed, considering 
rather that Art.1(4) did not refer to the legal status of the compensatory body 
                                                        
47
 at [20]. 
48
 See for instance Case C-2/97 Klaus Konle v Republic of Austria [1999] ECR I-3099 and 
Case C-118/00 Gervais Larsy v Inasti [2001] ECR I-5063. 
49
 Foster, and Griffin and others v South West Water Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 15. 
50
 Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo SpA v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839. 
51
 Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC [1986] ECR 1651. 
52
 Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(Teaching) [1986] ECR 723. 
53
 Case 8/81 Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53. 
54
 National Union of Teachers and others v Governing Body of St Mary's Church of England 
(Aided) Junior School and others [1997] IRLR 242 CA. 
55
 The bipartite test (established in national court) identified a body having the status as an 
emanation of the state where 1) it acted under the authority or control of the state or 2) had 
‘special powers.’ The cumulative tripartite test was established in the CJEU (but applied by 
the House of Lords) and consisted of the body being made responsible by the state for: 1) 
providing a public service; 2) under the control of the state; and 3) for those purposes has 
‘special powers.’ Neither test is absolute and it appears that the bipartite test may be more 
appropriate for non commercial bodies (e.g. the board of governors in National Union of 
Teachers and others v Governing Body of St Mary's Church of England (Aided) Junior School 
and others [1997]). 
56
 Case C-424/97 Salomone Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein [200] ECR I-
5123. 
57
 Mighell and ors v Reading [1999] 1 CMLR 1251. 
58
 Case C-63/01 [2005] All ER (EC) 763. 
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and the “fact that the source of the obligation of the body in question lies in an 
agreement concluded between it and a public authority is immaterial…” 59 
Similarly, in Rieser Internationale Transporte GmbH v Autobahnen-und 
Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG 60  and Sozialhilfeverband Rohrbach 61 
limited liability companies owned by the Austrian state and a local authority 
association (respectively) were still held as emanations of the state. The 
state’s control (direct or indirect) of the organisation was pertinent to its 
designation. If one also considers the public service function of the MIB, its 
requirement to follow the provisions of the MVID, to compensate victims of 
uninsured and untraced drivers, its duty to compensate for motor vehicle 
accidents abroad, and its relationship with the Department for Transport, it 
satisfies many of the necessary public service provisions. Further, evidence of 
its control by the state can be seen in the agreements reached between the 
two, and the requirement for it to comply with the MVID. Finally, the MIB’s 
ability to almost single-handedly legislate on behalf of the state when 
establishing the UDA and UtDA,62 the levy it imposes on its members, its 
powers to settle claims, its powers to compel disclosure and to deny access to 
compensation for infractions of procedural requirements, appear collectively 
to be strong indicators that it does possess the necessary special powers 
(under Foster), bestowed by the Secretary of State, far beyond those 
applicable between individuals. When this issue is raised again in the national 
courts, both Foster and Evans v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions will be instrumental in clarifying the status of the 
MIB as an emanation of the state. 
 
Therefore, in requiring the body to give effect to the law through the vertical 
direct effect of directives, the MIB would likely be susceptible to claims by an 
affected victim in national courts relying on the MVID. Even were this not the 
case, it would leave the UK in a precarious position. Art.10 is clear in the 
requirement on member states to establish the compensatory body to satisfy 
claims from victims of uninsured or untraced drivers. This duty evidently lies 
with the state (although it can make whatever local arrangements are 
necessary to provide this basic function). Were the UK to be successful in 
arguing that the MIB has no public function (in accordance with the Foster 
reasoning), the consequence would be that the UK has been in breach of the 
MVID since the requirement to establish a compensatory body was 
introduced. 
 
The UDA 2015 and UtDA 2003 (as amended) each consist of deficiencies 
which breach EU law and would enable enforcement mechanisms to be 
pursued. This is a matter of subsidiarity and consequently how the law is 
actually enforced is a matter for the state to determine in relation to the 
principles of effectiveness and equivalence.63 This has caused problems in 
the application of the MIB agreements (particularly so the UtDA 2003) as 
                                                        
59
 at [34]. 
60
 Case C–157/02 Rieser Internationale Transporte GmbH v Autobahnen- und 
Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG (Asfinag) [2004] ECR I–1477. 
61
 Case C-297/03 Sozialhilfeverband Rohrbach [2005] ECR I 4305. 
62
 Bevan, N. “Bad Law?” (2014) 164 New Law Journal 7624, p.7. 
63
 Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. 
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there exists no obvious comparable civil procedure by which to test the 
equivalence criterion.64 Conversely, the EU parent MVID and its imposition of 
obligations on the state is a matter of EU law and the underlying principle 
applicable here is its ability to be invoked in domestic courts. Hence, every 
citizen in the member states has the guaranteed protection of his/her rights, 
and this applies regardless of the choice of body / procedural route the state 
wishes to adopt. The result is that where the claimant applies to the MIB for 
redress, seeking to obtain an enforcement against it through use of the MVID, 
and this fails (either due to the absolute refusal of the MIB to entertain such 
an argument or because an appeal court holds the MIB as not satisfying the 
criteria as an “emanation of the state”), the fact that the claimant has sought 
to invoke EU rights obliges that court to give effect to the MVID due to the 
primacy of EU norms and this will manifest itself in a change in either the 
obligations between the MIB and the Secretary of State or a direct changing 
of the agreement itself.65 
 
The second issue, of where and when the MIB should become involved in 
issues relating to the consequences of motor vehicle claims, is even more 
concerning. Its position as insurer of last resort is misunderstood and almost 
universally misapplied in the UK. As Delaney, among many other cases, has 
demonstrated,66 the MIB is often invoked where an insurer wishes to avoid 
the insurance of the policyholder through this insured person’s breach of 
contract or other activity. The insurer argues that the activity removes its 
contractual responsibility of indemnification and thus requires the MIB to 
undertake the responsibility. Beginning with Churchill Insurance v Wilkinson 
and Tracey Evans, these joined cases involved individuals who were injured 
whilst passengers in vehicles in respect of which they held valid insurance. 
The driver, however, in each case was uninsured but driving the vehicle with 
permission. In Wilkinson permission was provided with the passenger’s 
knowledge that the driver was uninsured, whilst in Evans’ case the issue was 
never contemplated. In each case, s.151(5) RTA8867 operated to compel the 
insurer to fulfil the coverage required under the policy (a statutorily-imposed 
obligation), regardless of the breach by the policyholder. Section 151(8) 
however provided the insurer a (statutorily-granted) right to recover any sums 
paid out to the third party victim under the policy from the policyholder where 
he/she caused or permitted the use of the vehicle which gave rise to the 
liability. This caused a conundrum. The victims were insured to drive the cars 
in question, yet they were passengers in this instance and allowed the 
uninsured person to drive the car (they were the passenger victim and the 
policyholder at the same time). They were injured in the accident through the 
                                                        
64
 See for instance the (unsuccessful) arguments presented and challenges made to the 
national procedural arrangements in relation to the UtDA 2003 in Carswell v Secretary of 
State for Transport and MIB [2010] EWHC 3230 (QB) on the basis of the impossibility of 
excessive difficulty for the claimant to present a claim. 
65
 See Cour d’Arbitrage, judgment No.41/2005 of February 16, 2005, a case heard by the 
Belgian constitutional court. 
66
 Bevan, N. “A World Turned Upside Down” (2014) Journal of Personal Injury Law 3, p.136. 
67
 Section 151 RTA88, which imposes the duty on insurers to satisfy judgments against 
persons insured or secured against third party risks, is qualified against s.152 RTA88. Section 
152 RTA88 outlines exclusions from liability and imposes procedural obstacles prior to the 
insurer being liable for any sum awarded. 
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uninsured driver’s negligence and hence made a claim against the insurer for 
compensation. The insurer was obliged to make good on the claim although 
of course any award made to the passenger under the policy following a 
s.151(5) action would be clawed back by the insurer against the policyholder 
through the insurer invoking s.151(8).  
 
The cases were decided differently at first instance and were heard at the 
Court of Appeal (which made a preliminary reference to the CJEU). The CJEU 
reiterated the protection afforded to a third party victim through the MVID and 
that the only exclusion to the insurers indemnity requirements as permitted in 
Art.2(1) of the Second Directive (and contained now in Art.13 of the Sixth 
Directive) is where the passenger voluntarily entered the vehicle causing the 
loss or damage in the knowledge that it was stolen and the insurer can prove 
this knowledge. The MVID was to be interpreted as precluding any national 
rules which seek to exclude automatically an insurer’s obligation to 
compensate a passenger injured in an accident caused by a driver who is not 
insured to drive the vehicle concerned. This did not prevent the operation of 
s.151(5) in its entirety. It was the automatic nature of its application that was 
contrary to the MVID and future cases should be determined on their 
individual merits. This is the position due to the MVID, which are not intended 
to harmonise civil liability but rather to establish basic safeguards below which 
the member states may not transgress. The states’ powers to limit or to 
exclude liability are not removed, insofar as the MVID’s effectiveness is not 
undermined.68 This does cause possible confusion for the future application of 
s.151(8) RTA88 as the Court of Appeal adopted a rewording of the Act 
(suggested by the Secretary of State) to facilitate the MVID provision, but 
refused to expressly exclude its application to situations where the victim and 
policyholder were one and the same person (a circularity argument). 
Therefore, insurers may be successful in seeking to claw back damages 
awards from the policyholder in similar circumstances to Churchill Insurance v 
Wilkinson and Tracey Evans but where, perhaps, the victim(s) included a 
pedestrian rather than the passenger in the vehicle, this will remain in breach. 
 
A further (probably unintended) consequence of the actions of the Secretary 
of State and the Court of Appeal in Churchill Insurance v Wilkinson and 
Tracey Evans is the application of s.143(b) RTA88 which provides a direct 
cause of action for the third party where the policyholder has caused or 
permitted the use of an uninsured vehicle. In permitting him/herself to be a 
passenger in a motor vehicle driven by an uninsured driver, the policyholder’s 
action is directly causative of the insurer’s loss. This decision may have led to 
the establishment of a policyholder’s responsibility in (a newly developed) 
tort69 of wrongfully exposing the insurer to liability under s.151(5) (unless the 
policyholder takes proactive steps to remove permission), 70  and a new 
species of statutory fault. 
 
Returning though to the issue at hand, the MIB became embroiled in cases 
such as Delaney, Churchill Insurance v Wilkinson and Tracey Evans and 
                                                        
68
 Case C-129/94 Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829 at [19]. 
69
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70
 See Lloyd-Wolper v Moore [2004] EWCA Civ 766. 
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Farrell (in the Irish equivalent – the MIBI) even though in each case insurance 
was held by the policyholder. In Delaney, Pickett was the driver but the 
insurer used s.151(5) RTA88 to obtain a declaration that his contractual 
breach absolved it of any requirement to indemnify.71 In Farrell, the victim 
suffered injury whilst travelling in the rear of a vehicle unsuitable for the 
carriage of passengers which led to the insurer using statutory provisions to 
deny responsibility. In each case, however, the national MIB body was used 
to deal with the compensation for the victim due to the insurers’ denial of 
indemnity for breach of contract, allowed in national law. Jay J, in Delaney, 
appeared to take a holistic view of the protection of third party victims and that 
the matter was simply whether the system operated effectively as one unit.72 
 
It was in the Hungarian reference in Csonka73 where the CJEU put to rest any 
issue of the appropriate use of the MIB (and similar organisations used 
throughout the member states). The issue arose when insured individuals 
became personally liable for claims arising out of road traffic accidents when 
their insurer, MAV General Insurance Company, became insolvent and 
unable to satisfy claims. The victims tried to claim from the Hungarian 
equivalent of the MIB and the state required guidance on the interpretation of 
the MVID and in particular Art.10 which confined the obligation on the national 
compensating body to recompense a victim of the use of “a vehicle in respect 
of which no insurance policy exists.” Evidently there did exist motor insurance 
by the policyholders and consequently the Hungarian MIB was not obliged to 
compensate victims of the policyholders whose insurer had become insolvent. 
The CJEU was unequivocal as to the role of the MIB as insurer of last 
resort.74 The outcome of this ruling is that the UDA 1999 and 2015 only apply 
to those cases where the vehicle which is responsible for the victim’s loss or 
damage has no insurance in place or to those where the exclusion relates to 
passengers and their (provable) knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. 
Beyond this permitted exclusion, no other exclusion clause or limitation of 
liability against the third party victim is allowed and the insurer is required to 
fulfil the award of damage itself, either as a contractual or statutory (s.151) 
insurer. Almost more importantly, the ruling effectively removes the (in)famous 
Article 75 procedure75 which operated in Delaney and enabled the insurers to 
exploit the inherent weaknesses of the UDA 1999 (such as benefiting from the 
                                                        
71
 Although note the development of the law relating to consumer contracts (including motor 
vehicle insurance contracts). The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 
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 at [39]. 
73
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1999 (on poorer terms than would be available through claims against the insurer).  
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application of the MIB agreement and the cl.6(1)(e)(ii) escape from liability 
clause). 
 
Similarly, the existing s.151(4) RTA88 establishes an avoidance of liability 
route for the insurer where the victim is injured as a passenger in a stolen 
vehicle and this victim “knew or had reason to believe that the vehicle had 
been stolen or unlawfully taken…” (authors’ emphasis). Despite this term 
being applied as to the victim’s actual knowledge or whether they deliberately 
chose not to notice or care,76 following case law from the CJEU, it would no 
longer provide an effective exclusion of liability on behalf of the insurer.77 
 
Enforcing the MVID 
 
Since Evans v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions,78 the Secretary of State for Transport has faced a number of claims 
alleging different failures to properly implement the MVID. Whilst not all of 
these claims have been successful, 79  the position is looking increasingly 
tenuous for the existing arrangements. In Byrne, the distinction in the 
application of protective rights between the MIB agreements in insurance, 
compared with the procedure application of remedies available in torts law, as 
enshrined in ss.28 and 38(2) Limitation Act 1980, demonstrate not only the 
problems in existence between insurance and torts liability, but also the 
uneasy relationship between national law and the EU parent. It required the 
Court of Appeal, affirming the decision of the lower court and relying heavily 
on Evans, to confirm that the MIB agreement and its operation to be 
“equivalent to” that provided under the court system. 80  In his judgment, 
Carnwath LJ criticised the Department for Transport for its failure to take 
action, noting that the judgment in Evans itself “… might have been expected 
to trigger a more active response from the Department.”81 
  
It was as a result of Byrne, and in an attempt to avoid further state liability 
claims, that the UK agreed, on 30 December 2008, to the first variation of the 
UtDA, which removed the offending time limit exclusion and replaced it with a 
requirement that, in the case of a claim for death or personal injury, an 
application must be made to the MIB within “… the time limits provided for the 
victims of traced drivers bringing actions in tort by the Limitation Act 1980…”82 
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However, the Department was also forced to agree additional arrangements 
with the MIB in respect of those claimants whose claims had already been 
unlawfully rejected under the old provisions.83  Furthermore, less than five 
years later the Department considered that another amendment in respect of 
limitation was necessary, this time so as to remove the requirement for 
property damage claims to be brought within nine months of the accident,84 
and instead to subject claims of all types to the limitation periods for the 
victims of untraced drivers bringing actions in tort under the Limitation Act 
1980.85  
  
Arguably the most damaging blow to the arrangements was delivered by Jay 
J through his High Court judgment in Delaney v Secretary of State for 
Transport 86  regarding the (in)compatibility of cl.6(1)(e)(iii) UDA 1999 with 
Art.1(4) of the Second European Motor Vehicle Directive. The substantial, 
determinative issue in Delaney was whether the exclusion cited within Art.1(4) 
was the only permissible exclusion and therefore whether the (crime) 
exclusion in cl.6(1)(e)(iii) was consistent with the specific exclusion permitted 
by Art.1(4) of the directive. Relying heavily on Advocate-General (A-G) Lenz's 
opinion in the case of Ruiz Bernáldez (C-129/94)87 and also the more recent 
cases of Candolin v Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio Pohjola 88  and Farrell v 
Whitty89 (cases not strictly relating to the obligation under Art.1(4)), Jay J held 
the UK to be in “plain breach” of its EU obligations (with regards to a lack of 
discretion as to the exclusions of liability and discretion being assessed 
according to EU law, not the state’s instructions or the powers afforded to the 
official or institution under national rules.)90 Since 1996 and the decision of the 
CJEU in Ruiz Bernaldez, member states had no reason to be misinformed 
that they did not possess discretion to add to the list of exclusions of liability 
under those directives. Secondly, existing decisions of the Court of Appeal will 
ultimately be determined as having been incorrectly decided. In EUI v Bristol 
Alliance Partnership,91 the Court of Appeal, when considering Ruiz Bernaldez, 
held that the principles established were not of general application. Even 
though the Court of Appeal did not specifically identify EUI in the Delaney 
judgment, it appears to be self-evident that future submissions based on the 
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principle established therein must be open to question (and the operation of 
s.148(2) as a finite list be abandoned).92 
 
Taking time to assess the seriousness of the UK’s breach, the court referred฀ 
to the Francovich, Brasserie, and Factortame 93  tests (which collectively 
establish the modern application of the tests to be satisfied).94 The first of the 
tests being satisfied relatively easily, the most complex and traditionally 
challenging test of whether the state’s breach of EU law was “sufficiently 
serious”฀95 to warrant the imposition of liability in damages was discussed. 
Typical examples (if such a concept exists) of sufficiently serious breaches of 
EU law include: (1) where the state’s (wilful) transposition failure has caused 
the individual to be denied the rights conferred by the directive;96 (2) where 
the state had little room for discretion in the transposition process and it failed 
to adequately give effect to the law;97 and (3) where the state had failed, 
completely, to transpose the law in the prescribed period. 98  It was in 
Bayerische HNL Vermehrungsbetriebe GmbH & Co. KG v Council and 
Commission of the European Communities, 99  as later confirmed in 
Factortame III100 where the court held “… the decisive test for finding that a 
breach of Community law is sufficiently serious is whether the member state 
or the Community institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded 
the limits on its discretion.”101 To manifestly and gravely disregard its limits on 
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discretion is a high test to satisfy, evidenced in the relatively low success rate 
of challenges against the UK102 since the Francovich judgment.103 However, 
in Delaney and the reference to the UK’s transposition of the “crime exclusion 
clause” into national law, the court held the UK possessed no discretion104 or 
legislative choice, 105  and this resulted in the State being afforded no 
availability of a defence to Delaney’s argument. 106 Regardless of the attempts 
by the State to bend the wording of the EU parent directive and the national 
implementing measures to satisfy its defence, the court rejected each as 
without justification. It was also no defence that the state had not intended to 
breach the law or that it had not received any legal advice before enacting the 
national law. 
 
Similarly, when the Vnuk ruling is applied to the UK, an innocent victim 
suffering injury in similar circumstances on private land may be advised to 
now bring a state liability action against the UK on the basis of the ‘geographic 
scope’ restriction of the RTA88. The UK seemingly has no discretion in the 
restriction of compulsory third party insurance on private land; the extension 
of liability since 2000 to a “road or public place” is not sufficient to provide the 
required protection to vulnerable individuals, and the first and third Francovich 
criteria are particularly straightforward (and as such need no discussion here). 
Conversely, a claim for damages against the UK on the basis of the use of 
‘vehicles’ for the RTA88 would unlikely succeed in state liability due to the 
differing approaches observed throughout the member states’ implementation 
and use of discretion in transposition. Requiring a consistent statutory 
interpretation of the CJEU’s Vnuk ruling would, however, be required and 
would give effect to the provision. 
 
Historically, the judiciary has at times been unwilling to give effect to EU law, 
particularly if this would have been to distort the meaning of legislation when 
giving such effect.107 However, since Litster v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering 
Co Ltd,108 this approach has been identified as incorrect where the national 
legislation was clearly intended to transpose the Directive. Further, 
Ghaidan 109  also enables the judiciary, through the exercise of statutory 
interpretation, to add and/or remove words to facilitate compliance. Whilst 
Ghaidan involved the interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1988, Underhill P 
in EBR Attridge LLP v Coleman110 found nothing “impossible”111 about taking 
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such an approach in relation to the interpretation of EU-based law, although 
he continued that the interpretation of national law was “… an extension of the 
scope of the legislation as enacted, but it is in no sense repugnant to it.”112. 
Such reasoning had already been provided by Lords Nichols and Rodger in 
Ghaidan, where they remarked that purposive statutory interpretation of the 
national law in light of the EU parent would not extend to an interpretation that 
was not “compatible with the underlying thrust of the legislation”113 or one 
which was “inconsistent with the scheme of the legislation or with its general 
principles.”114  Finally, in the most significant case on the power of indirect 
effect, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA held 
that courts are permitted to insert “additional words... They could be taken out; 
they can be moved around.”115 As such, Marleasing not only provides the 
domestic court with the tools to be creative and expansive in its interpretation 
but actively requires the court to adopt this approach. 
 
Defining “motor vehicle” and the geographic scope of motor vehicle 
insurance  
 
Part VI RTA88 provides for the requirement of compulsory third party motor 
insurance. In s.143 provision is made for a person not to use (or cause to be 
used) a motor vehicle on a road or other public place unless there is in force 
in relation to the use of the vehicle insurance or security in respect of third 
party risks. Where this is not adhered to, an offence may be committed, 
unless an exclusion, as provided for in RTA88, is applicable. 
 
In Vnuk, 116  the CJEU addressed the issue of “use of vehicles” and the 
requirement for motor vehicle insurance to apply beyond a road or public 
place, thereby calling into question the UK’s restrictive interpretation of motor 
vehicle and the requirement for compulsory motor insurance to apply to motor 
vehicles operated on a “road or other public place.” Here Mr Vnuk was injured 
whilst carrying out work in a barn on farmland. He fell from ladders when a 
driver, using a tractor and drawing a trailer, backed the trailer into the ladders 
on which Vnuk was standing. Under Slovenian law, there was no requirement 
for an insurance policy to cover injuries concerned with accidents involving 
the use of vehicles on private land. 
 
Vnuk argued that the interpretation provided by the court was too narrow in 
that the word “use” did not relate only to, nor was its meaning restricted to, the 
use of vehicles on public roads. As there was no definition provided in 
national legislation, a reference was made to the CJEU on the concept of “the 
use of vehicles” within the meaning of Art.3(1) of the First Directive, 
specifically where the incident did not occur in the context of a road traffic 
accident. 
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In his opinion, A-G Mengozzi identified that the insurance obligation under 
Art.3(1) had been initially based on the need to remove the insurance checks 
carried out at the borders of each member state before vehicles entered their 
territory. Prior to this enactment, such checks hindered the freedom of 
movement of persons and of goods. Despite these initial reasons, and the 
success on this criterion achieved by the First Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Directive, the legislation evolved and expanded its reach to specify the 
protection to be afforded to victims of road traffic accidents.117  
 
Therefore, Mengozzi considered that it was clear that the CJEU (having 
interpreted the provisions of the MVID which may be favourable to victims118 
broadly and generously and interpreting restrictively those provisions which 
aim or have the effect of excluding categories of persons from the obligation 
to pay compensation119) intended the MVID to protect individual victims of 
accidents on private land. When examining the terminological imprecision of 
the EU legislature and the diversity of national practices,120 confusion and 
ambiguity in the transposition of EU law was present. Depending upon which 
version of the directive provided in the Official Journal one was to use,121 the 
interpretation of the use of motor vehicles was open to seemingly expansive 
interpretation. As such, two broad arguments were present. The first restricted 
obligations in respect of road traffic accidents (the position adopted by the 
defendant in the proceedings before the referring court). The second was to 
adopt a broad interpretation whereby the obligation extended to covering any 
damage connected in any way with the use or operation of the vehicle.  
 
National case law has frequently departed from the wording of the transposed 
legislation in order to extend, or on the contrary and perhaps more commonly, 
to restrict the scope of the obligation to take out insurance. Using just two 
                                                        
117
 As provided for at [37]: Directive 84/5 laid down the principle of compulsory cover for 
damage to property and personal injuries, set the minimum guaranteed amounts of 
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member states as examples, the Court of Cassation (Luxembourg), adopting 
the broad approach,122 held that a vehicle covered by insurance against civil 
liability in respect of motor vehicles is, unless otherwise agreed, insured 
wherever it is, irrespective of whether or not the damage has been caused in 
a traffic incident. On the contrary, the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis 
teismas (Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court) used a significantly more 
restrictive interpretation than that to which its national law appeared to 
authorise. It held that the owner of the vehicle involved in an accident 
occurring in an enclosed area was not subject to the obligation to take out 
insurance.123 This situation established a pressing need for clarity as to the 
meaning of Art.3(1) because:  
 
“[the concept] of ‘circulation’ or ‘use’, which in itself makes no express 
reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of 
determining its meaning and scope, must be considered an 
independent concept of EU law and therefore be given an independent 
and uniform interpretation throughout the EU…”124  
 
The lexicon employed through the evolution of the MVID also appeared to 
give weight to Mengozzi’s broad interpretation of the First Directive. The 
directive focuses on the notion of the vehicle in the context of a road traffic 
situation, using concepts such as “vehicles normally based,”125 “movement of 
travellers” and “use of vehicles.” 126  However, such wording evolved to 
distance itself from such “vehicle-centred”127 terminology and rather began to 
adopt a more “person-centred” approach. This manifested itself in the subject 
matter of the insurance being the categories of accident victims, be they 
“passengers other than the driver,” 128  “parties involved in a road traffic 
accident,”129 “any passenger,”130 and “injured parties to the accidents.”131 The 
trend, it appeared, was towards the concept of the accident itself and there 
was no connection with “road traffic” or the “use” of the motor vehicle required 
in every circumstance. For example, the MVID refer to an “accident caused... 
by a vehicle,” 132  “motor vehicle accident[s],” 133  “accidents caused by... 
vehicles,”134 and “accidents... caused by the use of vehicles”.135 Completing 
                                                        
122
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123
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this line of reasoning, Mengozzi referred to Art.8 of the Fourth Directive which 
amends, in part, the First Directive. Whilst noting that this amendment did not 
concern the classification of the risks to be covered by compulsory insurance 
as laid down in Art.3(1), as stated in Point 10 of Annex A to Directive 
73/239,136  reference is made, in respect of civil liability of motor vehicles 
operating on the land, to “[a]ll liability arising out of the use of motor vehicles 
operating on the land (including carrier’s liability).” The conclusion to be drawn 
is that Directive 73/239 does not restrict the risk to be covered to road traffic 
incidents.  
 
Ultimately the CJEU held “vehicle”, for the purposes of Art.3(1), can include 
agricultural machinery including attachments to it and, in the last paragraph of 
its ruling, commented “the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ in article 3(1) covers 
any use of a vehicle that is consistent with the normal function of that 
vehicle.” 137  The CJEU, whilst commenting on the different national 
approaches regarding road use or partial road use in the interpretation of the 
directive when transposing its provisions into domestic law, identified the 
importance of a consistent approach. The concept of “use”, pertinent as it is to 
the application of Art.3(1) could not be left to individual member states to 
determine.  
 
In the aftermath of Vnuk, s.185 RTA88 provides a definition of ‘the meaning of 
motor vehicle’ which is clearly too restrictive to comply with the MVID. 
Vehicles currently exempted from the RTA88 and its requirement to hold 
compulsory motor vehicle insurance will now fall within this category – even 
perhaps ride along mowing vehicles.138 Section 143(1)(a) RTA88 requires that 
“a person must not use a motor vehicle on a road [or other public place] 
unless there is in force… a policy of insurance.” Even given the additional 
words included following Clarke v Kato and Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance 
Ltd 139  it is evident that “other public place” must now be interpreted 
purposively as securing a right to compensation in places where the public 
have, or can be expected to have, access. Following Harrison v Hill, 140 
‘public’, in relation to statutory provisions of the RTA 1930 is not a term to be 
held as identifying a special class of persons who have occasion to visit the 
premises for the purposes of business or social engagements, nor is a public 
place restricted to one where individuals are invited or granted permission. A 
distinction must be drawn between that definition and one of “places” where 
the general public have access due to the nature of it being open to them. 
Vnuk has resolved much of the confusion in the RTA88 surrounding those 
roads or areas where s.143 applied and where it did not, yet of course, s.143 
RTA88 remains the domestic law applicable and requires the lawyers and 
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judiciary to apply the Vnuk ruling via Marleasing and Pfeiffer.141 It would be 
compatible with, and arguably not inconsistent with the thrust of the RTA88 for 
the courts to insert the words “or other public or private place” (authors’ 
emphasis) to give effect to the MVID and whilst it may be almost “simpler” for 
an innocent victim to claim against the state for damages, an action via 
indirect effect would have the broader implications of necessitating an 
immediate change in the application of the existing law for all parties (pending 
any legislative action the government is currently assessing). Despite Lord 
Clyde’s judgment in Cutter and the Lords’ refusal to use Marleasing to stretch 
the concept of “road” to “or any public place” this seems to be a 
misunderstanding of the requirement on the judiciary to utilize the purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation. This was certainly not the approach taken 
by the Employment Appeal Tribunal recently in USDAW v Ethel Austin Ltd 
and WW Realisation 1 Ltd142 where it (albeit later to be held as an incorrect 
interpretation143 of the parent EU directive in question)144 deleted words145 
from national legislation146 to ensure a consistent approach could be followed. 
Both Delaney and USDAW v Ethel Austin point to a willingness on the part of 
the judiciary to use the full extent of its powers in fulfilling EU requirements on 
consistent interpretation and of awarding damages to individuals when 
caused loss through the state’s breach. Finally on this point, even where a 
consistent interpretation of the law is not possible, the judiciary cannot avoid 
its EU obligations as:  
 
“… the national court is… obliged to disapply that [incompatible] rule, 
provided always that this obligation does not restrict the power of the 
competent national courts to apply, from among the various procedures 
available under national law, those which are appropriate for protecting 
the individual rights conferred by Community law.”147  
 
Unlike in Cutter where the advocates attempted to persuade the judiciary to 
follow their interpretation of the national law, the national and EU courts have 
clearly identified that the current national provisions are in breach of EU law; 
hence the only options open to a court when faced with actions based on the 
RTA88 ss.144B(5)(b) and 152(2) are to purposively interpret the law 
according to Marleasing and Pfeiffer or to disapply the law under the 
Factortame reasoning. 
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Conclusions  
 
The UK is required to take remedial action to reconcile the incompatibility of 
the RTA88 and MIB agreements with the MVID. Sections 143 (the duty to 
insure), 145 (third party insurance cover), 148 (limitations on certain 
exclusions within the holder’s insurance policy), 150 (private use of a vehicle), 
151(4) (knowledge of theft or unlawful taking), 152 (exceptions to indemnity 
under s. 151), 185 (definition of a motor vehicle), and 192 (definition of road or 
other public place) RTA88 are all in breach of EU law. Lawyers guiding their 
clients need to be aware of these breaches and how to correctly give effect to 
the proper construction of the MVID. Marleasing and Pffeifer require the 
judiciary to purposively interpret the RTA88 to give effect to the MVID in 
domestic courts, and state liability actions have been demonstrated in 
Delaney to be considerably more accessible in national courts due to the UK’s 
clear and fundamental breaches of EU law (as confirmed in the case law of 
the CJEU), ignored by the UK and disregarded by the MIB. Given the 
likelihood that the MIB would be held as possessing the status of an 
emanation of the state, it may be subject to the direct use (effect) of the MVID 
and the state is vulnerable to damages actions for losses incurred by 
individuals for the incorrect / non-transposition of the MVID. This is not limited 
to claims following the Delaney ruling, but can be back-dated to other cases 
where the individual had suffered loss and failed to bring such an action 
(under the equivalence and effectiveness principles and subject to national 
law such as the Limitation Act 1980). 
 
Not until the 1 August 2015 had the MIB agreement taken into account the 
implications of the Delaney ruling, albeit continuing with a raft of errors and 
continuing breaches of the MVID and being non-retrospective which affects 
any injured person or those suffering loss prior to 1 August 2015. The 
government has yet to amend the RTA88 in respect of Vnuk and those issues 
raised in this paper which are contrary to the MVID. Such a policy of inaction 
can be effectively remedied through litigation and public awareness. In the 
absence of immediate and more complete action by the state, exposure to 
liability and continued political disobedience is the consequence. 
 
